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BEFORE THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT NAGPUR
Election Petition
Election Petition No. 01 / 2004
Shri Banwarilal B. Purohit
Versus
1)Shri Vilas Muttemwar
2)Returning Officer
3)Election Commission of India
DEPONENT: Shri Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
Son of Shri H.Y. Sharada Prasad
Resident of: 19 Maitri Apartments
Block A - 3, Paschim Vihar
New Delhi 110 063
AFFIDAVIT OF EXAMINATION IN CHIEF
I, Shri Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad, Son of Shri H.Y.
Sharada Prasad, born on 07 September 1960 at New
Delhi, and Resident of 19 Maitri Apartments, Block A -
3, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi 110 063, the deponent
named above, do hereby take oath and state on solemn
affirmation as under:
(1) I say that my professional and educational
qualifications are:
(i) Master of Science degree in Electrical and
Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15213, United States of
America, acquired during the years 1982 to 1986.
(ii) Master of Engineering degree in Metallurgical
Engineering and Materials Science, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15213, United
States of America, acquired during the years 1982 to
1985.
(iii) Lead Assessor Diploma (with Honours) in System
and Software Quality Assurance of the European Union’s
BOOTSTRAP Programme of the European Strategic
Programme for Research in Information Technology.
The Honours Diploma was awarded in the year 1993 jointly
by the University of Freiburg in Germany and the
University of Graz in Austria.
(iv) Master of Science in Physics, Indian Institute of
Technology, Kanpur, 208016, acquired during the years
1977 to 1982.
(v) Member of the Research Staff at the Robotics
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, 15213, United States of America, during
the years 1985-1986, working on projects sponsored by
the American Association for Artificial Intelligence.
(2) I say that I am a technical and engineering
consultant in the fields of electronics,
microelectronics, circuit design, computer software,
hardware, telecommunications, and data communications.
I further say that I have nineteen years of
international professional experience in providing
engineering and technical consultancy and advisory
services in these fields to multinational
corporations, international organizations, and leading
Indian business houses.
(3) I say that I have published several hundred
articles on these subjects in leading international
and Indian scientific and technical journals,
scholarly journals, as well as mass media magazines
and newspapers.
(4) I say that I write frequently on technical and
management policy issues in leading Indian journals
such as Hindustan Times, Indian Express, Times of
India, Economic Times, Telegraph, Hindu Business Line,
Observer of Business and Politics, etc. I further say
that I am frequently interviewed by various television
channels in India and abroad regarding technical and
management policy issues.
(5) I say that at the invitation of the Hindustan
Times newspaper, I wrote the following article on
Electronic Voting Machines in April 2004 in the run up
to the Lok Sabha elections in April-May 2004, based on
my in-depth technical knowledge and experience:
In his article, "Press to Play" (Hindustan Times,
Saturday, 17 April 2004), Kanishka Singh described the
various ploys used by polling officials to have votes
cast in favour of their preferred candidates by an
electorate unfamiliar with electronic voting machines.
Singh stated: “The problems experienced with EVMs in
the December elections were many. None of them,
however, are problems that can't be solved.” But, in
fact, there are serious problems with EVMs which
cannot be easily resolved, more fundamental than the
psychological stratagems used by polling officials to
influence a technically illiterate electorate.
The reliability of the electronic voting machines
manufactured by the public sector Bharat Electronics
Limited and Electronics Corporation of India Limited
is doubtful. The software and circuits embedded in the
EVMs could very well contain numerous flaws or
deliberate backdoors for tampering.
A maxim of software and microelectronics engineering
is that all
software and electronic and electromechanical systems
are to be
regarded as error-prone unless rigorous testing proves
them to be reliable. Significantly, neither BEL nor
ECIL have disclosed details of the electronic hardware
and software used in their EVMs for scrutiny by
neutral experts.
After the US election fiasco in 2000, USA passed the
“Help America Vote” Act, which encouraged the use of
electronic voting machines. Several companies, mainly
Diebold Election Systems, Election Systems & Software,
Hart InterCivic, Sequoia Voting Systems, Advanced
Voting Solutions, and Unilect, manufactured EVMs which
were used in local and state elections in USA.
Prominent technologists, mainly Peter Neumann of
Stanford Research Institute, David Dill of Stanford
University, Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins University,
Rebecca Mercuri of Harvard University's Kennedy School
of Government, and Erik Nilsson of the Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility, launched
public campaigns questioning the reliability of EVMs
manufactured by these companies. They proved that all
these EVMs had serious flaws and could be used to rig
elections without being detected.
In an election in Dallas, EVMs made by Election
Systems & Software failed to count 44,000 votes. In a
local election in Iowa, EVMs made by Election Systems
& Software produced a count of 4 million votes in a
polling booth of 300 people. In Indiana, an EVM
recorded more than 144,000 votes for an electorate of
19,000.
Diebold's EVMs turned out to be a major scandal with
allegations of bribery. Diebold sold its EVMs to state
and local governments even though it knew that there
was no security on its tabulation software to prevent
someone from changing votes and erasing any trace of
the activity in the audit log. Anyone with access to
the tabulation program during an election -- Diebold's
employees, election staff or even hackers -- could
change votes and alter the log to erase all evidence.
Requests to the Election Commission, BEL and ECIL to
provide details of the reliability of their EVMs
brought forth the following bland assertion:
"Tamper proof design
The EVM is designed to be totally tamper proof. Each
EVM comes with a sophisticated programme in assembly
language : a software fully sealed against outside
influence. And the programme is itself fused on to a
customised micro processor chip at the manufacturer's
end. This ensures that the program is rendered tamper
proof and inaccessible.”
The Election Commission, BEL and ECIL did not provide
any of the
circuit schematics, source code, or test vectors asked
for.
The EVMs manufactured by BEL and ECIL could very well
contain the following flaws, which would be
practically undetectable without extensive testing by
experts:
* Faulty logic, incorrect algorithms and data flows
* Errors in circuit design
* Errors in the software code, especially in the
embedded software. Programming in Assembly language is
notoriously error prone, even by experts.
* Errors, or malicious backdoors, in databases
* Malicious trapdoors in the code to enable rigging
Reliance should not be placed on the demonstrations
provided by ECIL and BEL. Even without deliberate
tampering, embedded software and real-time control
software can behave very weirdly when they encounter
situations that their programmers had not envisaged
might occur. Any experienced engineer would tell you
that electronic equipment containing firmware or
embedded software frequently behaves one way during a
short trial, and totally differently in actual field
conditions.
For instance, I can write a software module which
would pass all trials but manipulate the results of
actual voting. I could programme the EVM to accurately
record votes for three hours. I could instruct it to
then assign 70 % of all subsequent votes cast to
whichever candidate was leading at the end of the
first three hours, irrespective of whichever buttons
the later voters actually push. Since trials and
demonstrations would reasonably be expected to last
less than three hours, my EVM would successfully pass
all such tests. I could then have my favoured
candidate get all his supporters to cast their votes
first thing in the morning, so that he would be the
leader after three hours of polling. This was alleged
to have been done in a local election in USA but could
not be proved since the audit trails had also been
erased.
Or I could program the EVM so that at the end of five
hours of polling, it would transfer 60% of the votes
of the ten lowest candidates to my favoured candidate.
Or I could program it so that it would, say, transfer
every fourth vote for the Congress to the BJP.
Or I could manipulate the back-end databases during
the counting
process, as was done in the Diebold cases where it was
proved that any election could be rigged, totally
without detection, by tampering with the back-end
databases after the votes were cast.
Moreover, the EVMs could be broken into remotely after
the election but before the counting. All electronic
circuits are subject to electromagnetic interference.
Even when the EVMs are kept physically sealed in a
strong room, an expert who knows the resonant
frequencies of the circuits could remotely send
signals to the EVMs from several kilometres away. It
is highly unlikely that polling officials would
continuously transport and store each and every EVM in
electromagnetically shielded Faraday cages.
It is also not know what vibrations and physical
shocks the EVMs can withstand. After the voting, when
the EVMs are being transported over bumpy rural roads,
the electromechanical components (especially registers
and switches), relays, and physical connectors could
be reset due to the jerks.
The Election Commission should pay heed to the
warnings issued by the dozens of distinguished
technologists who formed the Verified Voting
Foundation in USA (http://www.verifiedvoting.org):
“Computerized voting equipment is inherently subject
to programming error, equipment malfunction, and
malicious tampering. All computer systems are subject
to subtle errors. Moreover, computer systems can be
deliberately corrupted at any stage of their design,
manufacture, and use. The methods used to do this can
be extremely difficult to foresee and detect.
....
Unfortunately, there is insufficient awareness that
these machines pose an unacceptable risk that errors
or deliberate election-rigging will go undetected,
since they do not provide a way for the voters to
verify independently that the machine correctly
records and counts the votes they have cast. Moreover,
if problems are detected after an election, there is
no way to determine the correct outcome of the
election short of a revote.
....
It is therefore crucial that voting equipment provide
a voter-verifiable audit trail, by which we mean a
permanent record of each vote that can be checked for
accuracy by the voter before the vote is submitted,
and is difficult or impossible to alter after it has
been checked.
....
Without a voter-verifiable audit trail, it is not
practical to provide reasonable assurance of the
integrity of these voting systems by any combination
of design review, inspection, testing, logical
analysis, or control of the system development
process. For example, a programmer working for the
machine vendor could modify the machine software to
mis-record a few votes for party A as votes for party
B, and this change could be triggered only during the
actual election, not during testing.
....
Most importantly, there is no reliable way to detect
errors in recording votes or deliberate election
rigging with these machines. Hence, the results of any
election conducted using these machines are open to
question.
....
At this time, the only tried-and-true technology for
providing a voter-verified audit trail is a paper
ballot, where the votes recorded can be easily read
and checked."
(end of quote from VerifiedVoting.org)
Based on the three criteria of:
(a) Lack of a verifiable paper / manual audit trail
(b) BEL and ECIL not having provided the algorithms,
source codes, embedded firmware, integrated circuit
schematics, board designs and electronic component
specifications, to neutral experts for independent
assessments
(c) Meagre evidence in actual field conditions, as
opposed to short demonstrations in laboratory
conditions
it cannot be unequivocally asserted that the EVMs made
by BEL and ECIL are accurate and reliable.
Thousands of hours of testing needs to be done, under
actual field conditions, before their reliability can
be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
is currently formulating standards that EVMs should
satisfy. The Open Voting Consortium, an international
group of researchers, has spent over four years
developing open-source voting systems. They intend to
give away their technology for free.
The switch from manual voting to EVMs might turn out
to be exchanging the known flaws of booth capturing,
ballot stuffing, multiple voting, etc. for as yet
unknown vulnerabilities.
by
Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
I further say that, after editing and shortening by
the editorial staff of the Hindustan Times newspaper
to meet the constraints of space, this article of mine
was published under the title “Ghosts in the Machine”
by Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad, on the Edit Page of the
Hindustan Times newspaper, issue of Monday, 26 April
2004 (copy enclosed), and also posted on the website
of the Hindustan Times.
(6) I say that at the invitation of the Indian Express
newspaper, I wrote the following article on Electronic
Voting Machines in May 2004 during the Lok Sabha
elections in April-May 2004, based on my in-depth
technical knowledge and experience:
The first two rounds of polling brought numerous
reports of malfunctioning electronic voting machines.
In Nunagapaka village of Andhra Pradesh, early voters
complained that when they pressed the button of the
Congress, the light of the Telegu Desam glowed. The
presiding officer, K. Vijayalakshmi, stopped the
polling process and replaced the EVMs, but 89 votes
had already been cast in the first two hours. The
Election Commission is to adjudicate on these 89
votes.
In Sadasivapet in Andhra Pradesh, early voters
complained that when they pressed the button of the
Telangana Rashtra Samithi, the light of the Bharatiya
Janata Party glowed. Again the presiding officer
replaced the EVM, but by then 138 votes had already
been cast.
In Wardhannapet in Andhra Pradesh, polling agents of
the Telangana Rashtra Samithi alleged that after 75
votes had been correctly recorded, a long sequence of
votes was continuously recorded in favour of the
Telegu Desam. Finding this suspicious, the polling
officer sealed the EVM.
EVMs were also reported to have malfunctioned in
Warangal, Khamma, Sattupalli, Takillapadu, and
Karimnagar in Andhra Pradesh, but these instances
appear to be more of breakdowns rather than deliberate
rigging.
The EVMs manufactured by the public sector Bharat
Electronics Limited and Electronics Corporation of
India Limited could contain the following flaws, which
would be practically undetectable without extensive
testing by experts:
* Faulty logic, incorrect algorithms, and erroneous
data flows.
* Errors in circuit design.
* Mistakes in the software code, especially in the
embedded software.
* Mistakes, or malicious backdoors, in databases.
* Malicious trapdoors in the code to enable rigging.
Requests to the Election Commission, BEL and ECIL to
provide the entire circuit schematics, source codes,
and test vectors for scrutiny by neutral experts
merely elicited the following laconic response:
“Tamper proof design
The EVM is designed to be totally tamper proof. Each
EVM comes with a sophisticated programme in assembly
language: a software fully sealed against outside
influence. And the programme is itself fused on to a
customised micro processor chip at the manufacturer's
end. This ensures that the program is rendered tamper
proof and inaccessible.”
A subsequent request brought the terse reply that even
the Japanese manufacturer of the circuits would not be
able to tamper with the voting or find out who voted
for whom.
Reliance should not be placed on the demonstrations
provided by ECIL and BEL. Electronic equipment
containing firmware or embedded software frequently
behave totally differently in actual field conditions
from the way they behave during short trials. Even
without deliberate tampering, embedded software and
real-time control software can behave very weirdly
when they encounter situations that their programmers
had not envisaged might occur.
I can write a software module which would pass all
trials but manipulate the results of actual voting. I
could programme the EVM to accurately record votes for
three hours. I could instruct it to then assign 70 %
of all subsequent votes cast to whichever candidate
was leading at the end of the first three hours,
irrespective of whichever buttons the later voters
actually push. Since public demonstrations would
usually last less than three hours, my ‘tainted’ EVM
would successfully pass all such tests. I could then
have my favoured candidate get all his supporters to
cast their votes first thing in the morning, so that
he would be the leader after three hours of polling.
This was alleged to have been done in a local election
in USA but could not be proved since the audit trails
had also been erased.
Or I could program the EVM so that at the end of five
hours of polling, it would transfer 60% of the votes
of the five lowest candidates to my favoured
candidate. Or I could program it so that it would
transfer every third vote for candidate 2 to candidate
10 after a certain sequence of buttons were pushed,
say votes for candidates 3, 14, 11, and 9. Candidate
10 could then get four of his supporters to vote in
sequence for candidates 3, 14, 11, and 9. Both these
were alleged to have been done in local elections in
USA. Even in response to lawsuits, the US EVM
manufacturers refused to make their proprietary
circuits and software codes public, stating that these
were trade secrets of great commercial value. This is
what might have happened in the Andhra Pradesh
instances.
If someone wanted to engineer a repoll, he could bring
an electromagnetic pulse generator near an EVM and
erase its memories. The EVMs could also be interfered
with after the election but before counting. All
electronic circuits are susceptible to electromagnetic
interference. Even when the EVMs are kept physically
sealed inside a strong room, an expert who knows the
resonant frequencies of the circuits could remotely
send signals from several kilometres away. It is
highly unlikely that polling officials would
continuously transport and store each and every EVM in
electromagnetically shielded Faraday cages.
It is also not know what vibrations and physical
shocks the EVMs can withstand. After the voting, when
the EVMs are being transported over bumpy rural roads, the electromechanical
components, registers, switches, relays, and physical connectors could be
reset due to jerks.
An IIT alumnus and professor of electronics in USA,
Satinath Choudhary, had filed Public Interest
Litigation in the Supreme Court, pointing out
technical flaws in EVMs and requesting that they
include provision for an audit trail and a paper
backup. Following several scandals, California
recently passed legislation requiring all EVMs to have
paper backups.
On 30 April 2004, then Chief Justice V.N. Khare,
present Chief Justice S. Rajendra Babu, and Justice
S.H. Kapadia delivered the following order:
“Heard the petitioner, who is appearing in person.
In case the petitioner files any representation, the
Election Commission may consider his suggestions.
With the observations made above, the writ petition
stands disposed of.”
Several leading technologists, including IIT alumni
and professors of engineering in North America, are
planning to petition the Election Commission to open
the EVMs to expert scrutiny, and to have them modified
to include paper backups and audit trails.
India can draw upon the expertise of the Open Voting
Consortium, an international group of researchers,
which has spent over four years developing open-source
voting systems. They intend to give away their
technology for free. The international Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers is also currently
formulating standards that EVMs should satisfy.
Based on the three criteria of:
(a) Lack of a verifiable paper / manual audit trail
(b) BEL and ECIL not having provided the algorithms,
source codes, embedded firmware, integrated circuit
schematics, board designs and electronic component
specifications, to neutral experts for independent
assessments
(c) Meagre evidence in actual field conditions, as
opposed to short demonstrations in laboratory
conditions
the assertions made by BEL and ECIL that their EVMs
are accurate cannot be accepted at face value.
Thousands of hours of testing needs to be done, under
actual field conditions, before their reliability can
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The easiest method
of doing this, while maintaining the anonymity of the
voter, is:
(a) Modify the EVMs to include a printer.
(b) After a voter presses the button of his candidate,
give him a printed receipt which will verify that the
vote is really recorded for the candidate he voted
for.
(c) Have the voter deposit this printouts in a ballot
box.
(d) Compare the results of the EVMs with the manual
counting of the printouts to check whether they are
identical.
(e) In the event of any discrepancy, the paper vote
should be regarded as the real one.
This should be done for several dozen elections before
it can be
asserted that the EVMs do not contain any errors or
deliberate trapdoors for rigging. Otherwise, the
switch from manual voting to EVMs might turn out to be
exchanging the known flaws of booth capturing, ballot
stuffing, multiple voting, etc. for as yet unknown
vulnerabilities.
Meanwhile, during the next two rounds of voting,
voters should take the following precautions.
I. Ensure that the “Ready Lamp” is lit before you cast
your vote. If the “Ready Lamp” is not lit, then the
EVM will not register the button you press, and the
next voter or presiding officer can cast ‘your’ vote
for a candidate of his choice.
II. Ensure that you, and not the electoral officials,
press the button next to the candidate of your choice.
III. Ensure that the light flashes next to the button
of your candidate that you have pressed and the long
beep is heard, before you exit the booth. This ensures
that the EVM has registered your vote.
by
Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
I further say that, after editing and shortening by
the editorial staff of the Indian Express newspaper to
meet the constraints of space, this article of mine
was published under the title “We Need To Know More
About EVMs” by Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad, on the Edit
Page of the Indian Express issue of Wednesday 05 May
2004, (copy enclosed), and also posted on the website
of the Indian Express.
(7) I say that there were several news reports in the
mass media about malfunctioning Electronic Voting
Machines during the Lok Sabha polls in April-May 2004.
(8) I say that according to information received by me
and believed by me to be true, the Government of India
had constituted a committee headed by Professor P.V.
Indiresan, former Director of Indian Institute of
Technology, Madras, and former Dean of Indian
Institute of Technology, Delhi, to investigate the
reliability of Electronic Voting Machines. I further
say that according to information received by me and
believed by me to be true, the Government of India and
the Election Commission of India have, to date, not
made the report of this committee available to the
public, in spite of repeated requests by members of
the public and technical experts.
(9) I say that according to information received by me
and believed by me to be true, the Election Commission
of India, and Bharat Electronics Limited, and
Electronics Corporation of India Limited, have not
allowed their Electronic Voting Machines to be
independently examined by neutral experts.
(10) I say that Shri A.N. Jha, Deputy Election
Commissioner and Spokesperson to the Election
Commission of India, wrote the following letter to the
Editor of the Hindustan Times in response to my
article which was published under the title “Ghosts in
the Machine” by Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad, on the Edit
Page of the Hindustan Times, issue of Monday, 26 April
2004 (copy enclosed):
MOST IMMEDIATE
BY FAX / BY SPECIAL MESSENGER
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi - 110 001
No. 491/Misc./2004/MCPS
Dated: May 14, 2004
The Editor,
Hindustan Times,
Hindustan Times Building,
18-20, Kasturba Gandhi Marg,
New Delhi-110001.
Sir,
Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad wrote on the EVM in the
Hindustan Times issue of 5 May 2004. He had also later
written in Indian Express issue of 26 April, 2004. He
has raised various doubts about the fidelity and
reliability of the EVMs. He referred to two villages
of Andhra Pradesh where in the first day of poll on 20
April, 2004 some voters had complained that while they
pressed the button for the Congress, the light against
the TDP glowed and where, therefore, the polling was
stopped and the machines were replaced.
While it is not possible to take out these ‘offending’
machines at this juncture to find out the truth in the
allegation because the election process is not
complete as yet, it is possible, however to comment on
this issue. It is noteworthy that the complaint came
only from two polling stations in respect of one
machine each. There was no similar complaint from any
other place which went to poll on that day either in
Andhra Pradesh or anywhere else in the country. There
were no such complaints on the second day of polling
in Andhra Pradesh. A similar ‘claim’ was
half-heartedly spread in Bihar that on pressing the
button for RJD, the button against BJP candidate
glowed. But in Bihar unlike in Andhra Pradesh, there
was no specific complaint concerning any polling
station. It is noteworthy that on that day such a
complaint did not arise from any other polling station
across the country where polling had taken place.
As a technologist Mr. Prasad should know that
algorithm and software is not written for 2 machines.
And if there had been such a problem of faulty logic
or incorrect algorithm etc. the same complaint should
have come from all across the country and in any case,
at the minimum, from all places where machines
manufactured in that batch were employed.
Mr. Prasad says that the machines could contain the
following flaws:
* Faulty logic;
* Incorrect algorithms;
* Erroneous data flows;
* Errors in circuit design;
* Mistake in the software code;
* Mistake, malicious trapdoors in the code and so on.
In order to eliminate such possibilities what Mr.
Prasad wants are the circuit algorithms, schematics,
source code and test vectors etc. As a technologist
surely Mr. Prasad would know that for a scrutiny to
ensure that the machine functions correctly, instead
of seeking all that information the person raising
doubt could himself provide the set of test vectors
stipulating the input and the expected output for
correct functionality and also another set of such
test vectors establishing his apprehended incorrect
functionality that would vitiate the polling namely
vote against wrong candidate, non-registering of votes
etc. He would need the circuit schematic, source code
etc. only if there was indeed an acknowledged defect
and only if he were called upon to debug the system!
Shri Prasad lists out all that he can do with the
software of the machines: write software Modules which
would pass all trials and still manipulate the result
of an actual voting; succeed in assigning 70% of all
votes to a select candidate and thus making the chosen
candidate win etc. etc. While the software writing
capabilities of the Indians have received high praise
all over the world, what Mr. Prasad has claimed is
still stretching credibility to the breaking point. By
implication Mr. Prasad would like us to believe that
all that BEL or ECIL who are manufacturers of the
machines for the Election Commission of India and all
their R & D engineers are interested is to ensure that
the same party or some chosen candidates win
especially despite the fact that there are 543
constituencies with a different set of candidates
contesting in each one of them!
It is necessary to mention here that in the scheme
adopted by us the position of the candidate and
therefore the location of the button to be pressed to
cast a vote in his favour is decided not on the basis
of the name of his party but is decided on the basis
of where his name figures in the list of contesting
candidates arranged in the alphabetical order. The
software writer should be so exceptionally brilliant
as to be able to define this in the software code he
writes and arrange to have all the votes credited to
one or the other party he fancies. Further he has to
do it long before even the list of contesting
candidates is known as the manufacturers send the
machines to the States and districts even before the
nominations are opened. Even if he is not inclined in
favour of any party or parties, then Mr. Prasad would
have us believe, that the Software Engineers of the
two companies would merely do this to prove a point
about their (destructive) capability!
Mr. Prasad lists various methods by which after the
poll EVMs could be interfered with like erasing the
memory using a electromagnetic pulse generator,
sending signals from remote terminals etc. Mr. Prasad
would like us to believe that the country is crawling
with ‘mad’ engineers and technologists whose only goal
in life is to destroy the memory of all the EVMs all
over the place after the poll and create a chaos!
The EC had the machines scrutinized and evaluated by
an expert panel headed by Prof. P.V. Indiresan. The
Committee had examined all relevant issues and ‘noted
that the programme embedded in the device is
completely fixed and unalterable and therefore, there
is no means or access by which the system can be
modified from outside’. The Committee further noted
‘the major advantage of the EVM developed in India is
the fixed programme nature of the system. The
programme is permanently fused and hence cannot be
tampered with even if it can be accessed’.
EC is ever willing to open the EVMs for scrutiny again
if genuinely concerned persons approach it, but not
for people who try to draw a non-existent parallel
from the US elections and certainly not to those
scaremongers who are interested in writing
science-fiction.
Yours sincerely,
(A.N. Jha)
Deputy Election Commissioner &
Spokesperson to the Election Commission of India
(11) I say that Shri A.N. Jha, Deputy Election
Commissioner and Spokesperson to the Election
Commission of India, wrote an identical letter to the
Editor of the Indian Express in response to my article
which was published under the title “We Need To Know
More About EVMs” by Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad, on the
Edit Page of the Indian Express issue of Wednesday 05
May 2004, (copy enclosed).
(12) I say that according to several knowledgeable
persons, the letter of Shri A.N. Jha does not credibly
address or rebut any of the points that I made in my
two articles published in the Hindustan Times and the
Indian Express.
(13) I say that the editors of both the Hindustan
Times and the Indian Express consulted several
knowledgeable persons about the letter of Shri A.N.
Jha. I further say that the editors of both the
Hindustan Times and the Indian Express decided not to
publish the letter of Shri A.N. Jha, since it was
devoid of substance and did not credibly address or
rebut any of the points that I had made in my two
articles.
(14) I say that the international Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which is
the worldwide governing body of the profession, has
formulated IEEE Standard number 1583 which sets
performance standards for Electronic Voting Machines
worldwide. I further say that the Electronic Voting
Machines designed and manufactured for the Election
Commission of India by Bharat Electronics Limited and
Electronics Corporation of India Limited do not
conform to the requirements of IEEE Standard number
1583.
(15) I say that it would be easy for a saboteur to
open the EVMs from the bottom side, bypassing the
sealed and serially numbered top of the EVM, and
either replace or reprogramme the circuits inside.
This can be done within about fifteen minutes to one
hour. I further say that many electronic circuit
components, especially EPROMS, EEPROMS, and flash
memories, can be reprogrammed even without physically
removing them from the board. This could be done by a
saboteur after the voting was over but before the
counting.
(16) I say that whenever I cast my vote during
elections, I noticed that the EVM had a provision for
a serial or parallel communications port. I further
say that it would be possible for a saboteur to tamper
with the contents of the electronic components of the
EVM such as microprocessors, shift registers, adders,
etc. by connecting a computer or other such device to
the serial or parallel communications port of the EVM.
This can even be done remotely from several metres
away by using a wireless device to connect to the
serial or parallel communications port. This could be
done by a saboteur after the voting was over but
before the counting.
(17) I say that based on all the reasons and
possibilities for inadvertent hardware and software
errors or deliberate tampering or sabotage mentioned
by me above, especially
(a) Lack of a verifiable paper / manual audit trail
(b) BEL and ECIL not having provided the algorithms,
source codes, embedded firmware, integrated circuit
schematics, board designs and electronic component
specifications, to neutral experts for independent
assessments
(c) Meagre evidence in actual field conditions, as
opposed to short demonstrations in laboratory
conditions
the reliability and accuracy of the Electronic Voting
Machines used by the Election Commission of India is
highly questionable.
(18) I say that thousands of hours of testing needs to
be done, under actual field conditions and under the
scrutiny of independent experts, before the
reliability and accuracy of the Electronic Voting
Machines used by the Election Commission of India can
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. I further say that
the easiest method of doing this, while maintaining
the anonymity of the voter, is:
(a) Modify the EVMs to include a printer.
(b) After a voter presses the button of his candidate,
give him a printed receipt which will verify that the
vote is really recorded for the candidate he voted
for.
(c) Have the voter deposit this printouts in a ballot
box.
(d) Compare the results of the EVMs with the manual
counting of the printouts to check whether they are
identical.
(e) In the event of any discrepancy, the paper vote
should be regarded as the real one.
I further say that this procedure should be followed
for several dozen elections before the assertions of
the Election Commission of India, BEL, and ECIL that
their EVMs are reliable and accurate can be accepted
beyond reasonable doubt.
(19) I say that the Election Commission of India
should also publicize the procedures and standards
that it follows after the voting but before the
counting to ensure the safety and integrity of the
Electronic Voting Machines, and to ensure that the
EVMs are not tampered with by deliberate sabotage,
such as by replacement or reprogramming of the
electronic components.
(20) I say that the Election Commission of India
should also publicize the procedures and standards
that it follows after the voting but before the
counting to ensure that the election results are not
affected, either accidentally or deliberately, by
electromagnetic interference, lightning, high
voltages, etc.
(21) I say that the Election Commission of India
should also publicize the procedures and standards
that it follows after the voting but before the
counting to ensure that the election results are not
affected, either accidentally or deliberately, by
vibrations or jerks or dropping during transportation.
(22) I say that because the reliability and accuracy
of the EVMs used by the Election Commission has not
yet been established beyond reasonable doubt to the
satisfaction of independent experts, the results of
all elections conducted by using such EVMs are open to
question and challenge.
Hence this affidavit.
Shri Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
Son of Shri H.Y. Sharada Prasad
Resident of 19 Maitri Apartments
A - 3, Paschim Vihar
New Delhi 110 063
DEPONENT
New Delhi
Dated: Monday, 25 October 2004
VERIFICATION
Verified and signed at New Delhi on this Twenty Fifth
day of October 2004, that the contents of the above
affidavit from paras 1 to 21 are true and correct to
the best of my knowledge and belief.
Shri Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
Son of Shri H.Y. Sharada Prasad
Resident of 19 Maitri Apartments
A - 3, Paschim Vihar
New Delhi 110 063
DEPONENT
New Delhi
Dated: Monday, 25 October 2004
I know and identify the deponent.
Advocate
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